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Chapter 5
STATE AID IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND CROATIA
Marina Kesner-Škreb
Institute of Public Finance
Zagreb
Mia Mikiæ
Faculty of Economics
Zagreb
Bad government, like bad luck, kills off growth.
William Easterly, 2002, p. 217
ABSTRACT
EU policy on the state aid granted by member countries to
their national economies is based on a general presumption that state
aid is incompatible with the running of the single market. The
European Commission has the right to ban any state aid that distorts
market competition by extending privileges to certain firms and sec-
tors (or by favouring certain firms and sectors. The EU instruction is
that national state aid should be reduced and that it be reoriented
towards horizontal objectives, for only then are they assisting all
firms and sectors alike. In the Republic of Croatia government ex-
penditure to promote the economy is considerable and mainly direct-
ed towards certain sectors: shipbuilding, tourism, transport and agri-
culture. It is to be expected that in order to comply with EU policy
Croatia will have both to reduce the extent of state aid and redirect it
towards horizontal objectives.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to show what Croatia should do in
order to draw closer to the EU in its state aid policy. The remainder of
the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the policy of the
EU in the area of state aid is laid out; section three gives a survey of
state aid in Croatia, while the fourth section sums up by stating the cur-
rent situation of state aid in Croatia and what needs to be done to
approach the position of the EU. It should be noted that the paper is but
an initial attempt to draw up a review of state aid in Croatia as there are
almost no papers that discuss this matter. Research has been hampered
by the lack of published information about the kinds, recipients and
amounts of state aid. Precisely because the lack of proper figures, in this
phase of the research it was very difficult in a short period to give a reli-
able quantification of the amount of total state aid in Croatia. That is
why we provide only a review of state aid according to the agencies in
charge of granting it, in an attempt to delineate the sectoral distribution.
Increased transparency in the monitoring of state aid urged by the EU
in all of the candidate countries will certainly facilitate easier calcula-
tion of the extent of total state aid. Transparency of the state aid system
will facilitate monitoring and sectoral analysis, and will free govern-
ment policy concerning state aid from lobbyist pressures. 
ANALYSIS OF THE ACCESSION CONDITIONS
FOR THE NEW EU MEMBERS
State aid - reasons for and against
State aid is a form of state interventioni, the aim of which is to
encourage some economic activity, sector or firm. It distorts competi-
tion, because it discriminates between those who receive aid and those
who do not (Commission of the European Commission, 2002). What
does distortion of competition mean? The market criterion in the judge-
ment of whether some aid distorts the competition is: competition is dis-
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torted if no participant in the market wishes to invest the same amount
under the same conditions in a firm that the state supports (Lavadas and
Mendrinou, 1999). That is, the state, through its aid, redirects the flow of
investment into industrial activities and firms that private investors do
not invest in (Adams and Klein, 1985; Schultze, 1986; Krugman, 1986).
Traditional state intervention is commonly focussed on to the
state selecting those industrial activities or firms that are considered to
need assistance. These are either the future “winners”, that is, those
activities and firms expected to attain high rates of growth, or loss-mak-
ing undertakings and firms which use state aid for survival and rehabil-
itation. This kind of state intervention is premised upon government
possessing the analytical capacity to determine, better than the market,
the appropriate economic structure, to select the sectors and firms that
are potential winners, determine which loss-makers should be rescued,
and determine the measures through which this should be carried out.
But experience has demonstrated that this kind of traditional
approach is inefficient and does not lead to restructuring and growth.
The government has proven itself incapable in many ways. It has not
known how to pick a winning sector, it has not known when to stop
assistance, i.e., when a certain activity is capable of operating on its
own, and with its frequently wrongly chosen measures has brought
many distortions into the economy thus reducing economic efficiency.
Under pressure from various lobbies the network of state intervention
has become increasingly complex, and the state administration ever
more corruptible. When some intervention has become settled, there is
a risk that the government will become influenced by interest groups
who lobby, successfully, to keep the aid, although this is no longer eco-
nomically justified.ii Apart from that, there are always new candidates
who would find state aid quite handy. For why should agriculture be
subsidised and not tourism nor the food industry, which are linked with
agriculture? Under the pressure of interest groups, state aid is hard to
remove, new aid is granted, and the vicious circle is hard to break.
In addition, state intervention leads to unfair competition
between subsidised and non-subsidised firms. The lower prices that
can be charged by subsidised firms, and which are not the result of
increased quality or productivity, lead to well-performing but nonsub-
sidised firms but having to charge higher product prices being
squeezed out of the market. At the same time a growing state aid cre-
ates an increasing pressure on the government budget, which in turn
results in higher taxes and undermines the fiscal sustainability.
Ultimately state aid has to be financed out of taxes, and for this reason,
116
all taxpayers bear the cost of them. Although they face lower prices for
subsidised goods, consumers ultimately, through increased tax rates,
nevertheless pay the full price of such goods.
Although because of the many negative consequences of aid the
state should be very circumspect with its policy, it is also true that state
aid sometimes can stimulate growth. Thus the EU is not an opponent
of state aid, but thinks it should be directed only into areas where mar-
ket does not perform, i.e., where there are examples of market failure
(Commission of the European Community, 2000). The emphasis is
placed on the complementarity of government and market, and it is
considered that markets supported by the state are needed to attain suc-
cessful economic growth. Table 1 gives examples of market failures,
and the manner in which they can be palliated by aid.
Table 1. Market failures
Name of market Example of Most common form 
failure market failure of state aid
Public goods Lightouses, street lighting, Direct provision of the
public radio and television service by the state
Merit good Programs for vaccination, Subsidising or total
cultural services and- financing
elementary education
Economies of scale Monopoly or oligopoly Aid to firms entering 
markets the market
Externalities, positive Research and Subsidising; taxation
and negative developement; pollution regulation
Incomplete, imperfect SMEs find it hard to obtain Subsidised interest, 
or asymmetric finance guarantees, information
informations centres
Rigidity of the Minimal wage Reduction of contribution,
labour market subsidised wage
Reduced mobility of Work and capital move with Improving the quality
factors difficulty into undeveloped of infrastructure
regions
Difficult adjustements Firm or sector that needs to Help in exiting he
to market subsidizing be restructured market
Foreign subsidising Assistance to domestic Subsidies, negotiations 
industry to protect it from- in the WTO
the effects of subsidies 
granted by other countries
Source: European Commission, 1999; 25
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But for the use of state aid to be justified, it is not enough to
determine the existence of a market failure. It is also necessary to give
reasoned proof that the public sector can solve the particular problem
better than the private sector (Sandmo, 2002). Also very important is
the proper selection of the form of state aid. For all possible forms of
state aid, such as subsidies, tax exemptions, soft loans and others have
their advantages and drawbacks, and can have very different impacts
on the economic efficiency of a given sector, the economy as a whole,
and the welfare of the citizens. Before applying a given form of state
aid, it is necessary to compare all the benefits and costs (direct and
indirect) that it entails. 
EU policy with respect to state aidiii
Of the numerous regional groupings, only the EU in an
explicit manner determines the control of the state aid of its mem-
bers (European Commission, 1999). State aid undermines the prin-
ciple of unbiased and free competition, and amounts to a limitation
of the functioning and development of the single EU market. For this
reason the European Community Treaty set up a system of rules
allowing members to use state aid only in exceptional cases. 
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty basically says that state aid
and the single market are not compatible because state aid granted
to a firm or an activity affects trade among the member states. More
precisely, this article states that “all aid that is given by member
state in any form that distorts competition because by its partiality it
gives an advantage to given firms or products and thus has an effect
on the flows of trade among the members is not compatible with the
single market.” If the regulations of the countries were really to be
based only on this one article, then the member countries of the EU
would not have much room for intervention to support given regions
or national economies. However Articles 87(2) and (3) solve this
problem, clearly stating which aid measures may be permitted if
they do not adversely affect the common market. From the length of
the schedule of such state measures it is clear that a wide space is
left for aid at the level of individual countries and the whole of the
EU. Aid that is allowed in Article 87(2) relates to aid of a social
character, on condition that it does not result in discrimination of
products with respect to a national or regional origin; aid that makes
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good damage caused by natural disasters or other unpredictable
events and aid meant for those regions of Germany that were hit by
the division of the country. Article 87(3) expands the space for inter-
vention even further by listing aid that can be considered compatible
with the common market, for example aid that promotes the eco-
nomic development of areas in which the standard of living is atyp-
ically low or in which unemployment is very high; aid that makes
possible the conclusion of projects that are of common European
interest or those that mitigate serious distortions in a national or
regional economy; aid that makes possible the development of cer-
tain economic activities or areas and that does not have a deleterious
effect on commerce among the member countries; aid that promotes
the conservation of the cultural heritage and the environment, and all
other kinds of aid that the Council of Europe can vote in with a qual-
ified majority.
Considering the number and heterogeneity of the kinds of aid
allowed it is clear that the basic motivation for the control of state
aid at the EU level is not that it should be done away with or banned
rather that unnecessary distortion of market competition within the
EU be diminished. This is achieved by monitoring and regulating aid
and defining and adjusting the conditions in which member states
can provide specific structural and/or regional aid. Article 88 gives
the duty and right to control state aid to the European Commission.
For this reason, member states must inform the European Comm-
ission about national aid policies, and the Commission’s remit is to
determine whether they are compatible with the objectives of the
European Community Agreement. Of course, the Commission can-
not control every kind of instrument that national members can
apply and that affect or might affect corporate behaviour. Control re-
lates only to those measures that meet all the criteria stated in Article
87(1)iv, i.e., that a given measure of aid:
• means a transfer of state resources,
• results in an economic advantage that the firm or product would
otherwise not have, 
• implies selectivity, which means that the application of the meas-
ure changes the relationship among firms or products, 
• has an effect on the competition and trade between the member
countries. Aid is bound to modify the degree of competitiveness. 
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Accordingly, the general criterion of a permissible measure is
that it is in line with the obligations of the Agreement and that it is lim-
ited to the smallest possible measure necessary to achieve the aims of
the intervention. This actually means that the objective of every sec-
toral aid, to be acceptable, must be the attainment of the long-term sus-
tainability of the sector (which is achieved by settling structural prob-
lems or reducing capacity). If the aid that some state gives does not
meet these criteria, the European Commission has the duty and the
right to forbid such aid.
These measures became the subject of an active policy of reduc-
ing state aid. Thus at meetings of the European Council in Stockholm
in 2001 and in Barcelona in 2002, member states were required to
reduce state aid (defined in Article 87(1)) as proportion of GDP and to
redirect state aid to the support of horizontal objectives.v Horizontal
objectives prevent the possibility of regional or sectoral favouritism
and are concentrated on the removal of market failure and can be con-
sidered to distort competition less. Typical horizontal aid is directed to
research and development, environmental protection, the development
of SMEs, commerce, energy saving, restructuring of firms, employ-
ment, sustained training and so on. The most recent report of the Euro-
pean Commission about trends in aid in the EU (European Co-
mmission, 2002) shows that the members on the whole are adhering to
the Stockholm and Barcelona instructions, but that there are still great
disparities among them (Table 2).
An aid category that is very often used is what is called ad hoc
aid. All aid not foreseen by the existing instruments has an ad hoc char-
acter. Such aids are usually used for restructuring and bailing out firms.
They are characterised by the principle of minimal amounts and the
principle of non-recurrence, i.e., they are given only once and never
again. Most of this kind of aid goes to industry, particularly to the ship-
building and steel sectors (more than 50%), but a considerable number
of such aids are directed towards financial services and air transport. 
From this table it can be seen that in the EU state aid came on
average to 0.99%vi of GDP in 2000, and that it fell during the 1996-
2000 period. At the same time the proportion of horizontal aid rose,
and in 2000 it came to 47% of total aid.
Most aid goes on transportation, mining, agriculture and fish-
eries, and within the help to manufacturing industry, on shipbuilding
and steel production. The most frequent form in which aid was given
to industry and services was the subsidy (EU average 63%) and tax
120
exemptions (EU average 25%). However, there are considerable differ-
ences in the member countries; for instance, Luxembourg, Finland and
the UK give their support to manufacturing industry and services main-
ly via subsidies (95.91 or 96%), while Ireland uses these much less
often (only 19%), making much more use, however, of tax exemptions
(74%).
Table 2. Basic data concerning trends in state aid in EU member states
State Trends Horizontal Trends in the
aid as in aid as as % of proportion of
% of GDP % of GDP overall aid horizontal aid
(2000) (1996-2001)1 (2000)2 as % of overall
aid 1,2
EU 0.99 -0.25 47 12.2
Belgium 1.34 -0.11 77 3.0
Denmark 1.23 +0.15 83 0.7
Germany 1.23 -0.26 46 14.4
Greece 0.89 -0.40 8 4.4
Spain 0.99 -0.20 42 7.4
Finland 1.44 -0.30 71 1.3
France 1.13 -0.24 42 9.1
Ireland 1.20 +0.34 55 12.9
Italy 0.92 -0.47 33 11.8
Luxembourg 1.24 +0.18 47 9.9
Netherlands 0.98 +0.09 75 2.6
Austria 0.97 -0.18 58 -1.5
Portugal 1.18 -0.44 38 7.4
Sweden 0.75 -0.11 61 3.0
UK 0.46 -0.17 60 4.1
1 Change of percentage between annual average for the period 1996-1998 and 1998-2000
2 Total aid reduced by that for agriculture, fisheries and transportation.
Source: Commission of the EC, 2002
ANALYSIS OF STATE AID IN CROATIA
EU and state aid in Croatia
Through signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement
(SAA) Croatia, among the many obligations, took on obligations about
state aid. Thus Article 70 of the SAA stated that Croatia had to set up
an independent operational body for the monitoring and implementa-
tion of state aid. The work of this body would be to draw attention to
every item of state aid that would distort market competition by
favouring some firms or products. This body will approve programmes
of state aid and order the return of aid given illegally. It should also
draw up a comprehensive list of all aid programmes, and bring these
programmes into compliance with EU criteria in a period of at the most
four years from the time the SAA comes into force. There should be a
legal base for such activities in a state aid law. According to the plan
of the implementation of the SAA, the work of adopting this law, the
foundation of the body charged with state aid matters and the drawing
up of the list of existing state aid should be done during 2001 and 2002.
The objective of the EU demands made on Croatia is to increase the
transparency of the system of state aid and to see that state aid is fun-
nelled in line with the aims agreed on among the member states of the
EU. 
A review of state aid in Croatia 
This chapter will endeavour to give a brief overview of state aid
in Croatia. This is only a survey of a very complex phenomenon, and
not any kind of quantification of the total amount of state aid. For
information about state aid is not yet kept in any single place, and has
to be assembled from numerous sources, from Official Gazette, the
papers, the Web pages of individual ministries, or be obtained from
personal sources. This makes it more difficult to provide in-depth
analysis or evaluation of it. We hope that when the actions relating to
state aid that the EU has imposed as an obligation on Croatia are car-
ried out this problem will be solved, and that the review of such aid
will be more transparent.
The review of state aid has been done according to those in
charge of it; there are direct subsidies from the national Budget,
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favourable loans and guarantees that are given via the Croatian Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (known as HBOR), the Ministry for
Trades and SMEs (MOMSP) and the Croatian Guarantee Agency
(HGA); subsidised employment via the Croatian Employment Service
(HZZ/CES) and tax incentives that are given pursuant to the tax laws.
We have also put available information about corporate rehabilitation
into the review, which is also a considerable form of state aid in Croatia. 
Apart from these state aids, which have been being allocated for
quite some time, certain statutory approaches for the stimulation of the
economy have been passed that have not yet come fully into force.
Thus in July 2000 the Investment Incentives Law was passed, the aim
of which, via various measures (subsidies, tax and customs incentives
and so on) was to stimulate the development of the economy. During
2001, the following regional funds were set up: the Development and
Employment Fund and the Regional Development Fund, the aim of
which is also to encourage the development of the economy. The
newly founded Croatian Small Business Agency will also deal with the
stimulation of development, while support to Croatian exporters and
domestic and foreign investors will be supplied by the Promotion of
Export and Investment Agency set up in September 2002.
Figure 1. Direct subsidies as % of GDP
Source: MF Republic of Croatia, 2000 and internal data of Ministry of Finance 
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Direct subsidies from the national Budget
In 2000, 3.8 billion kuna in current subsidies were allocated
from the national Budget, coming to 2.4% of GDP (Ministry of
Finance, 2001). Subsidies recorded a jump in 1998, when they grew
from 1.86% GDP to 2.38%. In the period after 1998, they mainly
remained at the level of about 2.4% of GDP (Fig. 1).
It should be emphasised that subsidies are also allotted at a local
level as well, and not only from the national Budget. Thus in 1999, at
the level of general consolidated government, subsidies worth 3.9 bil-
lion kuna were given, but from the national Budget 3.4 billion kuna
(Ministry of Finance, 2001). The difference between the two sums is
made up of subsidies granted at lower levels of government. Thus in
1999 about 500 million kuna worth of local subsidies were allotted,
i.e., about 13% of national level subsidies.
In 2000, state subsidies were mainly allocated to transport and
communications (50% of overall subsidies), agriculture (38%), tourism
(7%) and shipbuilding (4%) (Fig. 2). There are no great differences
here between Croatia and the EU average. The biggest single benefici-
aries are Croatian Railways, subsidised to the tune of 1,276 million
kuna, agriculture with 1,233 million kuna, Jadrolinija Rijeka with 166
million kuna, BINA Istriavii with 288 million kuna, and firms in the
tourist industry with 266 million kuna.
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Figure 2. Direct subsidies as % of GDP
Source: MF Republic of Croatia, 2001 and internal data of Ministry of Finance 
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Favourable loans and guarantees of HBOR, HGA and the
Ministry of Trades and SMEs (MOMSP)
Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development (HBOR)
The fundamental activity of HBOR comprises programmes of
loans to firms and programmes of providing guarantees. With these pro-
grammes, HBOR takes part in the reconstruction and development of the
economy and the infrastructure, incentives to SMEs and financing and
giving security for the export operations of the Croatian economy.
According to HBOR’s Annual Report for 2000, 1.6 billion kuna
were spent on loan programmes, and 2.5 billion kuna for guarantees, i.e.,
a total of 4.1 billion kuna. About 90% of the total activity of HBOR was
accounted for by sectoral aid, and about 10% by horizontal measures,
this mainly for incentives to small and medium sized enterprises.viii
The interest charged on loans made available by HBOR via the
commercial banks are lower than the market rates for the end users. Via
its Interest Rate Decision, made by the Supervisory Board, HBOR sets
the interest rates for its loan programmes. On 26 February 2002 the
Supervisory Board of HBOR made an Interest Rate Decision according
to which the rates for end users ranged from 3% a year (for users with
direct war damage) to 7.5% for all other users. At the same time the
average interest rates of the commercial banks, for long term kuna
denominated loans to the corporate sector without a foreign currency
clause were 8.69% p.a. (Croatian National Bank, 2002). Thus the inter-
est rates for HBOR loans are much lower than the interest rates on the
money market. Via HBOR, then, the state allocates more favourable
loans and gives incentives for the development of business, mainly
tourism and shipbuilding, and partially the development of SMEs.
Croatian Guarantee Agency (HGA)
A relatively small guarantee business is done via the HGA,
which provides support for the development of enterprise. Aid relates
to small and medium size firms, sole traders, tradesmen, co-operatives,
individual farmers and freelance operators. According to the HGA
Annual Report (HGA, 2001), in 2000, 604 guarantees for loans am-
ounting to 115 million kuna were made, and 3.9 million kuna worth of
non-returnable aid was given. Most guarantees were made according to
the Programme for Areas of Special Concern of the Republic of
Croatia, that is, mainly for the regional development of SMEs.
Ministry for Trades and SMEs
The Ministry for Trades and SMEs (MOMSP) mainly hands out
loans to existing small enterprises or beginners, and for the develop-
ment of new technologies, export and tourism, and for restructuring.
Loans from the MOMSP programme are also approved and imple-
mented via the commercial banks and local self-government units.
During 2001, 2,264 loans were made, to a total amount of 1.1 billion
kuna, which is twice the amount loaned in 2000. In 2001, the loans
were made with an interest rate that ranged from 5.5 to 7.5% (Jutarnji
list, 2002). Thus, like loans from HBOR, loans from MOMSP are a
very favourable way for businesses to borrow money, and the differ-
ence between the subsidised interest and market interest rates is a
direct subsidy to the user of the loan.
Employment incentive
During 2002, the government adopted a Programme for
Employment Incentives (NN 21/2002), which contains six sub-pro-
grammes:
• A - From University to Job – for persons with a degree younger than
27 who took their degree within the average time for the institu-
tion.
• B - From Classroom to Workshop – for skilled and highly skilled
workers without work experience who are completing secondary
vocational schools.
• C - By Studying to Work for All – oriented to education for specific
labour market requirements.
• D - By Experience to Profit – for older persons with experience.
• E - Opportunities for Us Too – the employment of disable persons
and persons who are hard to employ.
• F - Jobs for the Defenders – hiring Croatian veterans and their wives
and children if they are unemployed.
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The institution in charge of these programmes is the CES. A
programme is carried out via the joint financing of hiring, the CES
subsidising for the employers some of the costs for the newly
employed and thus making labour cheaper. It is expected that during
2002, 14,029 people will be employed via these programmes, and that
179 million kuna will be spent (DZS, internal figures).
Tax incentives
The Profit Tax Law (NN 127/2000) allows taxation incentives
that have the form of indirect state aid to firms.
Incentives to regional development
Taxpayers who carry out some activity in an area of special
national concern pay profit tax at a rate that might be 25, 50 or 75%
of the prescribed rate of profit tax, i.e., 20%. In these areas, then, prof-
it tax comes to 5, 10 or 15%. Taxpayers in the area of the city of
Vukovar are totally exempted from the payment of profit tax for a
period of five years from the start of their activity, and after that have
to pay profit tax at 25% of the prescribed rate.
Incentives in free zones
Free zone users pay profit tax at a rate of 50% of the prescribed
rate. If a zone user invests 1,000,000 kuna in the free zone, in the next
five years it will not pay profit tax at all. If the free zone is in the area
of the Vukovar and Srijem County, it will not pay tax for five years
from start-up, and then will pay profit tax at 25% of the prescribed
rate. 
Investment incentives
Privileged profit tax rates depend on the amount of the invest-
ment and the number of employees in the firm. The opportunities for
taking advantage of privileged rates, which only new firms can have,
are given in Table 3.
Table 3. Tax privileges for investments
Employment incentives
The tax base can additionally be reduced by the amount of pay
and employer’s contributions for new employees during the first year
from their hiring. In this manner, these wages can be deducted twice:
first as an expenditure while the profit is being calculated, and the sec-
ond time as a reduction of the then determined base for profit tax.
Uncollected taxes
Uncollected taxes are usually considered an indirect subsidy.
Tax that is not collected and is written off by the government or is col-
lected in a reduced amount after a settlement is made with the taxpay-
er constitutes indirect financial aid to the tax defaulter. Apart from this,
such measures distort competition, because it puts regular taxpayers
into an unequal position as against the taxpayer whose debt is excused.
Croatia has a law in force called the Collection of Due but Unpaid
Taxes, Customs Duties, Contributions and Government [State]
Guarantees Law (NN 117/2001 and NN 95/2002). Taxpayers whose
debt was incurred up to 31 December 2000 have the right to come to a
settlement with the government, and pay their debts in one of these
ways: a one-time payment with a reduction, transferring claims, ceding
real estate, rescheduling claims and ceding claims or multilateral com-
pensation. The total claims with respect to uncollected debts to the
state come to more than 21 billion kuna. Within the time limit allowed
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Amount of Preferential Period of use of the Employment 
investement rate preferential rate obligation
At least 10 7% 10 years from the At least
milllion kuna beginning of the 30 employees
investment
More than 20 3% 10 years from the At least
million kuna beginning of the 50 employees
investment
More than 60 0% 10 years from the At least
milllion kuna beginning of the 75 employees
investment
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by the law, that is, until 23 January 2002, more than 35,000 debtors
(firms and tradesmen) reported a total of 5.33 billion kuna, or about a
quarter of the total debt to the state (Poslovni tjednik, 2002a). This tax
debt could be met by the debtors by a settlement with the state via one
of the models anticipated. Thus the state will collect part of the debt,
and the rest will become an indirect subsidy to these tax defaulters. The
remainder of the debt will probably never be collected, and in its full
amount can be considered an indirect state subsidy.
Corporate rehabilitation
Company bailouts are usually done by cancellation of debts or
by the transformation of them into equity. The EU classifies debt con-
version too as one of the forms of state aid because without such aid,
loss-making firms would not be able to survive on the market. In the
Republic of Croatia too such a form of help to loss-making firms is fre-
quently used, and the government has often made decisions attempting
to rehabilitate firms it owns. This has primarily concerned shipbuilding
and the agribusiness firms. Thus in February 2001 the government
adopted its Provisional Measure for the consolidation of companies in
agriculture in which the government authorised the line ministries to
write off their claims, to reschedule them or turn them into equity.
According to government estimates, the debts of the big agricultural
companies came to about 2.2 billion kuna (Jutarnji list, 2001).
In addition, after 1997, when the government of Croatia had
adopted its Decision to bail out certain companies (NN, 118/97), a res-
cue process was started up in five shipyards. Through this decision,
creditors were supposed to swap their undisputed due claims for
shares, or equity in firms owned by the Croatian Privatisation Fund,
or the Republic of Croatia. Since the government was dissatisfied with
the modest results of the rescue operation carried out, in August 2002
it adopted financial measures to help the shipbuilding industry that
came to a total of 2.8 billion kuna. These measures related to taking
over the repayment of loans to the national Budget and the write-off
of debts to the Ministry of Finance relating to payments made for
guarantees issued. The programme of these financial measures relates
to the period up to 2008. The government also obligated itself to sub-
sidise the building of ships in the amount of 10% of the sale price of
a ship (Vlada RH, 2002).
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Investment Incentives Law
In July 2002, the Investment Incentives Law was passed (NN,
73/2000), allowing a number of incentive measures to be carried out:
the leasing of real estate owned by the Republic of Croatia, assis-
tance in job creation, assistance in training and further training, tax
breaksix and customs privileges (non-payment of customs duties for
the import of equipment). These incentives are available only to new
firms for investments that come to at least 4 million kuna, domestic
firms having priorities in obtaining such privileges. During the two
years of the implementation of the law, only 9 firms obtained the
right to these incentives, in the amount of 803 million kuna (of
which, 646 million kuna relates to the firm Metro Cash & Carry)
(Poslovni tjednik, 2002b). But in 2002, an amendment to the law
was prepared, and it was in the parliamentary procedure during the
autumn.
Development incentives via the development funds
At the end of 2001 laws were passed to found two develop-
ment funds: the Development and Employment Fund and the
Regional Development Fund of the Republic of Croatia (NN,
107/2001). The funds are mainly financed from the Budget, and with
revenue from privatisation; they can also borrow short-term up to at
most 25% of the annual financial plan, and, pursuant to a govern-
ment decision, even more than that if resources from privatisation
have not accrued. Their basic objective is to encourage development
and employment. However, these funds cannot be said to have start-
ed working properly yet.
The Regional Development Fund
The work of this fund is to encourage the development of
war-torn areas, areas of sparse population, areas of special national
concern, the islands, the hilly and mountain areas, border areas,
areas with structural problems, areas that have a GDP lower than
65% of the national average, and other areas. The resources of the
Fund in these areas are meant for the implementation of infrastruc-
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ture and economic projects. The projects are chosen according to
competitive bidding announced by the Fund, with counties and their
projects taking part. A prior selection is carried out by a county for
its own region, based on cost-benefit analyses for infrastructure
projects, and on certain other criteria for business projects; prof-
itability, export orientation, environmental impact, being based on
domestic resources, and employment of the local population. The
final choice of projects is made by the Fund’s Board of Manage-
ment. The selected projects are financed with loans the conditions of
which the Board also sets, but which have to be more favourable
than those on the money market. According to the Fund’s Financial
Plan for 2002, it is expected that 611 million kuna will be invested
in regional development (NN, 26/2002).
Development and Employment Fund
The work of this fund is directed to the encouragement of
trades, SMEs, to providing support during hiring, the encourage-
ment of new technologies and export programmes, support for coun-
ty programmes, help in the foundation of business and development
centres, free and industrial zones, giving state-owned real estate for
development purposes and for the reconstruction of facilities demol-
ished in the war. After the announcement of invitations for bidding
by the Fund, the choice of projects is carried out by the counties,
which then recommend them to the Board of the Fund, which final-
ly takes them on. The projects are financed with loans not worse
than those on the capital market, by subsidising interest rates, pur-
chase of bonds, assignment of real estate and equipment that the
Republic of Croatia has at its disposal and with non-refundable aid.
Projects that create new jobs, that are viable on the market, export-
oriented, that use domestic resources and that meet environment
protection regulations will have the priority in the allotment of
resources. The Financial Plan of the Fund for 2002 envisages devel-
opment incentive resources to the tune of 3 billion kuna (NN,
26/2002).
Croatian Small Business Agency and the Promotion of
Export and Investment Agency
During 2002, two agencies were founded that have not fully
started working as yet. Thus the Incentives for the Development of
Small Business Law (NN, 29/2002) founded the Croatian Small Busi-
ness Agency, the Managing Board of which was appointed in Sept-
ember 2002 (NN, 103/2002). The objective of the Agency is to provide
incentives for the development of small business by a series of meas-
ures, from favourable loans, guarantees, aid to increase employment,
and the provision of information to entrepreneurs. Resources for the
work of the Agency are provided from the Budget, domestic and for-
eign funds and the banks.
In September 2002 the Promotion of Export and Investment
Agency was founded (NN, 102/2002), the business of which is mainly
to supply information support to Croatian exporters and to local and
foreign investors; this should start coming on-stream by the end of
2002.
The definition of areas in which adjustments to
EU conditions are required
Although the Croatian government has taken seriously the
preparations for Croatia’s association with and joining the EU, in the
area of state aid there is still a lot of work to do. This relates to bring-
ing the legal and institutional base into compliance, and also to an
analysis of economic arguments in line with European understandings
of the role of state aid. It is not in question that Croatia will have to
change its way of thinking about state intervention. In the past the state
made decisions about this independently. With EU entry, the final
word about most such interventions will go to the European
Commission. And although the Commission is very easy-going in giv-
ing its acceptance of aid in some member country, the fact is that on
paper at least, the policy is based on the assumption that state aid dis-
torts market competition and reduces efficiency. For this reason no sin-
gle member can make autonomous decisions about the majority of the
rules and instruments for giving aid. This, then, means that Croatia will
have to adjust its objectives according to which aim is given to prod-
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ucts, producers and regions. The hardest task will certainly to be to
redirect state aid away from individual economic sectors and to hori-
zontal targets.
In the area of the instruments that are used to implement aid
there will also have to be adjustments, although not as drastic as those
in relation to the actual targets. The introduction of differing tax regi-
mes to attract new investors or restructure the economy will increas-
ingly be considered an unacceptable form of state aid, and member co-
untries are advised against the use of differential rates of taxation. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
State aid works against the principle of unbiased and free com-
petition, and means a restriction in the functioning and development of
the single EU market. For this reason the EC Agreement set up a sys-
tem of rules according to which member states are allowed to give state
aid only in exceptional circumstances. State aid that distorts market
competition can be vetoed by the European Commission. The general
EU recommendation is that member states reduce the extent of state
aid up to 2003, and after that direct it to horizontal targets. This EU
preference with respect to state aid will in the future very largely deter-
mine Croatian policy too with respect to state aid.
In order to be able to evaluate more easily the situation of state
aid in Croatia with respect to EU demands, we tried above to system-
atise state aid according to the kind of division applied in the EU. All
aids that are used in Croatia, then, have been classified into three
groups: sectoral, horizontal and regional. It should be said that the
amounts in Table 4 cannot be aggregated in order to obtain the total
amount of all forms of state aid (subsidies, favourable loans, guaran-
tees, tax breaks and so on). there are four reasons for this. Firstly, we
do not have enough of the required information to calculate the amount
of state aid for each measure. For example, the amount of loans given
by HBOR to shipbuilding cannot entirely be considered state aid. State
aid is only the difference between the HBOR rate and the market inter-
est ratex. Secondly, the division of state aid into three groups means
there is some overlapping: some of the measures are found into two
groups. Thus HBOR loans for SMEs are included one time in horizon-
tal measures, and a second time in regional measures, where they refer
to loans to SMEs in areas of special national concern or on the islands.
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Measure Source/in charge Amount Year
(mil kuna)
Sectoral aid
tourism subsidies national Budget 266 2000
favourable loans HBOR 359 2000
shipbuilding subsidies national Budget 163 2000
favourable loans HBOR 697 2000
guarantees HBOR 2,503 2000
rescue operation government 2,800 2002
programme
transport and subsidies national Budget 1,907 2000
communications
agriculture subsidies national Budget 1,433 2000
rescue operation government 2,200 2001
restructuring subsidies national Budget 30 2000
and so on favourable loans HBOR 12 2000
exports favourable loans HBOR 180 2000
new firms for reduced profit Profit tax law
investments tax rate
larger than 10 
million kuna
Tax payers settlements about Collection of due 21,000 2000
unpayed tax but not collected
tax law
Horizontal aid
SMEs favourable loans HBOR 181 2000
guarantees HGA 115 2000
subsidies HGA 4 2000
favourable loans MOMSP 1,128 2001
infrastructure subsidies national Budget 0.3 2000
favourable loans HBOR 70 2000
enterprise subsidies national Budget 2.4 2000
improvements favourable loans HBOR 143 2000
employement subsidies Profit tax law 178 2002
incentives reduction of
profit tax for
newly employed
persons
Table 4. Sectoral, horizontal and regional state aid in the Republic of Croatia
Thirdly, data relate to different years. Fourthly, the list of state aid is
not complete – it does not include the work of the Development and
Employment Fund, the Regional Development Fund, measures acc-
ording to the Investment Incentives Law, the Croatian Small Business
Agency and the Promotion of Export and Investment Agency, because
at the present their total activity in providing business incentives is
nugatory.
However, irrespective of the restrictions given in the table, it is
clear that most state aid in the Republic of Croatia is directed to the
development of individual sectors, mainly to tourism, shipbuilding,
transportation and agriculture. In 2000, 3.8 billion kuna or 99% of
total subsidies from the national Budget were directed to these purpos-
es alone, as were 3.6 billion kuna in HBOR loans and guarantees, or
86% of this bank’s total activities. Additional stimuli to individual
firms and sectors can be expected from the more extensive future
activities of the Development and Employment Fund and the Regional
Development Fund, as well as the more thorough implementation of
the Investment Incentives Law.
Relatively few state resources went for horizontal purposes.
Most marked was the work of MOMSP, HBOR and HGA, which hand
out loans and guarantees for the development of SMEs. MOMSP is the
most active in this respect, via which 1.1 billion kuna went in 2001 for
loans to SMEs, the major state activity within horizontal measures.
SMEs are considered to find it hard to obtain loans, because the banks
do not have adequate information on the basis of which to estimate
their probable performance. At the same time, SMEs find it more dif-
ficult to access information about new technologies and markets. For
this reason state aid in correcting this market failure is considered a jus-
tified horizontal measure. During 2002, considerably extended CES
activity in subsidising new employment is anticipated.
Regional measures are mainly related to the stimulation of the
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Source: as in the text
Regional aid
areas of
special national favourable loans HBOR 89 2000
concern, islands
areas of special reduction of Profit tax law
national concern, profit tax
Vukovar,
free zones
development of areas of special national concern with tax breaks,
favourable loans and HBOR guarantees. With greater activity from the
newly-founded Regional Development Fund, the development of a
large number of undeveloped regions in Croatia will be assisted.
Regulations about incentives to island and mountain/hill country
development are in force, but there are still quite a lot of bureaucratic
obstacles in the way of their proper implementation.
Finally, attention should be drawn to the fact that the amount of
state aid in Croatia is large. Only subsidies from the national budget in
2000 came to 2.4% of GDP. For the same of comparison, all forms of
state aid in the same year in EU countries came to 0.99% of GDP
(ranging between 0.46 to 1.44% in the individual countries), and the
demand has been made that they be additionally reduced by 2003. Only
subsidies from the national Budget in Croatia are two and a half times
as great as total state aid (subsidies, assisted loans, tax incentives and
so on) in EU countries. It is thus to be expected that the EU will insist
that Croatia cuts its spending on state aid and redirects what remains to
horizontal targets at the expense of sectoral and ad hoc aid. An EU
demand that Croatia found a body to monitor and implement state aid
would increase the transparency of the system of state aid, and would
make the monitoring and analysis of, as well as state policy with
respect to, state aid easier. Croatia will, then, still be able to give state
aid, but will gradually have to bring it into line with EU requirements.
The first step in this process is the implementation of the provisions of
the SAA that should be accomplished during 2002, thus making the aid
system much more transparent.
i In this paper the term state aid means a form of state intervention, while the term sub-
sidy has a narrower meaning and indicates only one form of aid, that is, a direct aid from
the budget.
ii The statement of Mr. Boidar Pankretiæ, Minister of Agriculture , is quite telling: “Why
should someone sow wheat at all if he can’t get subsidies?” (Statement for Vjesnik,
printed in Jutarnji list, 30 June 2002 p. 10).
iii This part is largely based on European Commission, 1999, and Commission of the
European Community, 2002.
iv For a more precise description of these criteria see the European Commission, 2002.
v All sectors and firms are helped equally by horizontal measures, while sector- and
region- specific measures assist only selected firms and regions.
vi It should be noted that this amount covers aid that individual countries give their own
economies, and not aid that is given from the EU budget. The amount, then, does not
include aid to agriculture that the Union gives as part of the CAP, but only aid that indi-
vidual members give to their own agriculture. It is this information that is of interest in
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this paper, since it is necessary to determine what Croatia needs to do in order to
approach the policy of national aid that has been agreed on by EU countries.
vii BINA Istria is a firm set up for the financing, construction and management of the
Istrian Y – semi-motorway complex.
viii Some of this aid went to areas of special national concern, and has a regional char-
acter.
ix Described in Tax incentives.
x For a more detailed calculation of this difference, more figures would be required, and
they could not be collected in a short period of time.
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